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Abstract: The advancement of information technology has improved the delivery 
of financial services by the introduction of Financial Technology (FinTech). To 
enhance their customer satisfaction, Fintech companies leverage artificial 
intelligence (AI) to collect fine-grained data about individuals, which enables them 
to provide more intelligent and customized services. However, although visions 
thereof promise to make our lives easier, they also raise major security and privacy 
concerns for their users. Differential privacy (DP) is a popular technique for 
protecting individual privacy and at the same time for releasing data for public 
use. However, very few research efforts have been devoted to maintaining a 
balance between the corresponding risk of data disclosure (RoD) and data utility. 
In this paper, we propose data-driven approaches to differentially release private 
data to evaluate the RoD. We develop algorithms to evaluate whether the 
differentially private synthetic dataset offers sufficient privacy. In addition to 
privacy, the utility of the synthetic dataset is an important metric for the 
differential release of private data. Thus, we propose a data-driven algorithm that 
uses curve fitting to measure and predict the error of the statistical result incurred 
by adding random noise to the original dataset. We also present an algorithm for 
choosing an appropriate privacy budget ϵ to maintain the balance between privacy 
and utility. Our comprehensive experimental analysis proves both the efficiency 
and estimation accuracy of the proposed algorithms.  
Keywords: Differential privacy; risk of disclosure; privacy; utility 
1 Introduction 
The rapid development of data science and information technologies has resulted in the unprecedented 
use of open data by the government, commercial companies, and even nonprofit organizations. Financial 
Technology (FinTech) concept has evolved as a result of integrating innovative technologies into financial 
services, e.g. AI and big data, Blockchain and mobile payment technologies, to provide better financial 
services [1]. Investments in FinTech industry is trending upward, such that by September 2020 the global 
investment in Fintech was $25.6 Billion, reported by KPMG [2]. However, security and privacy of the 
users’ data is among the main concerns of the FinTech users [3]. Data governance and user data privacy 
preservation are reported as the most important challenges in FinTech due to the accessibility of user data 
by suppliers and third parties [3]. Some financial institutions rely on honest but curious fintech service 
providers which might be interested in accessing sensitive attributes of users’ data. Specially, in the case of 
small and medium businesses, who provide personalized financial services to their customers, with no 
background knowledge in security and data privacy, protection of users’ data becomes even more 
challenging.  
The “open data” concept and data sharing for banking industry has been promoted by several countries, 
including the UK. A report by the Open Data Institute, discusses the benefits of sharing anonymized bank 
account data with the public and suggests that such data release could improve customers decision making 
[4]. User data are usually shared with the data consumers via data release; herein, we consider scenarios in 
which data are released, i.e., where tabular data with numeric values (which could be related to user’s bank 
transactions, stock investments, etc) are to be published (or shared) by the data owner. However, data 
 
release often presents the problem of individual privacy breach, and there has always been a debate between 
data privacy and openness, reported by Deloitte [5]. A real-world example thereof is that, by using publicly 
available information, researchers from the University of Melbourne were able to re-identify seven 
prominent Australians in an open medical dataset [6]. Furthermore, researchers from Imperial College 
London found that it would be possible to correctly re-identify 99.98% of Americans in any dataset by 
using 15 demographic attributes [7]. Other relevant privacy incidents were also reported [8, 9]. All of these 
incidents provide evidence of privacy leakage because of improper data release.  
Recently, the United States and Europe launched new privacy regulations such as the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to strictly control the 
manner in which personal data are used, stored, exchanged, and even deleted by data collectors (e.g., 
corporations). Attempts to assist law enforcement have given rise to a strong demand for the development 
of privacy-preserving data release (PPDR) algorithms, together with the quantitative assessment of privacy 
risk. Given an original dataset (the dataset to be released), PPDR aims to convert the original dataset into a 
sanitized dataset (or a private dataset) such that privacy leakage by using the sanitized dataset is controllable 
and then publish the sanitized dataset. In the past, the former demands could be satisfied by conventional 
approaches such as 𝑘-anonymity, 𝑙-diversity, and 𝑡-closeness. However, these approaches have 
shortcomings in terms of syntactic privacy definition and the difficulty in distinguishing between quasi-
identifiers and sensitive attributes (the so-called QI fallacy), and therefore are no longer candidates for 
PPDR. In contrast, differential privacy (DP) [10] can be viewed as a de-facto privacy notion, and many 
differentially private data release (DPDR) algorithms [11] have been proposed and even used in practice. 
Note that DPDR can be considered as a special type of PPDR with DP as a necessary privatization 
technique. 
Although it promises to maintain a balance between privacy and data utility, the privacy guarantee of 
DPDR is, in fact, only slightly more explainable. Therefore, in the case of DPDR, it is difficult to choose 
an appropriate configuration for the inherent privacy parameter, privacy budget 𝜖. More specifically, DP 
uses an independent parameter 𝜖 that controls the magnitude of the injected noise, yet the selection of 𝜖 
such that the data utility is maximized remains problematic. On the other hand, although the value of 𝜖 
affects the magnitude of noise, it has no direct relevance to the risks of data disclosure, such as the 
probability of re-identifying a particular individual. In other words, the choice of 𝜖 such that the privacy is 
meaningfully protected still needs to be investigated. In practice, there is no clear recommendation by the 
regulatory institutions in Fintech industry on the preferred anonymization technique which could address 
the challenge of preserving privacy while providing openness. This might be due to the unclarity of privacy 
guarantee versus utility in the existing DPDR algorithms. Thus, a strong demand exists to develop novel 
measures for the risk of disclosure (RoD) and utility for DPDR. 
 
1.1 Related Work 
In this section we present a brief review of studies on the differentially private data release and the risk 
of disclosure. 
1.1.1 Differentially Private Data Release (DPDR) 
Privacy-preserving data release (PPDR) has attracted research attention because of the flexibility and 
potential applications of the released dataset. Thus, several de-identification techniques have been proposed 
to offer the function of PPDR. Among them, the most well-known is 𝑘-anonymity [12], with the central 
idea of generating 𝑘 − 1 similar records for each record by using generalization and suppression. These 𝑘 
similar records obfuscate the original record and provide the unidentifiability. Two follow-up techniques 
are 𝑙-diversity [13] and 𝑡-closeness [14], which further diversify the record values. Unfortunately, all of 
these techniques have been proved to be theoretically and empirically insufficient for privacy protection. 
Differential privacy (DP) [10] was recently proposed as a theoretical foundation of privacy research 
and used as a means to protect individual privacy. Since the introduction of DP, several DPDR algorithms 
have been proposed. Here, we place particular emphasis on the synthetic dataset approach in DPDR. 
 
Namely, the data owner generates and publishes a synthetic dataset that is statistically similar to the original 
dataset (i.e., the dataset to be released). It should be noted that, since 2020, the U.S. Census Bureau has 
started to release census data by using the synthetic dataset approach [15]. DPDR can be categorized into 
two types: parametric and non-parametric. The former relies on the hypothesis that each record in the 
original dataset is sampled from a hidden data distribution. In this sense, DPDR identifies the data 
distribution, injects noise into the data distribution, and repeatedly samples the noisy data distribution. The 
dataset constructed in this manner is, in fact, not relevant to the original dataset, even though they share a 
similar data distribution, and can protect individual privacy. The latter converts the original dataset into a 
contingency table, where i.i.d. noise is added to each cell. The noisy contingency table is then converted to 
the corresponding dataset representation. This dataset can be released without privacy concerns because 
each record can claim plausible deniability. 
Two examples in the category of parametric DPDR are PrivBayes [16] and JTree [17] . In particular, 
PrivBayes starts from the Bayesian network model, which combines low-dimensional distributions to 
approximate the full-dimensional distribution of a dataset. PrivBayes consists of the following steps. 1) 
Network learning: a 𝑘-degree Bayesian network 𝑁 is constructed over the attributes in the original dataset 
𝑂 by using an (𝜖/2)-DP method, where 𝑘 is a small value dependent on the affordable memory size and 
computational load. 2) Distribution learning: an (𝜖/2)-DP algorithm is used to generate a set of conditional 
distributions, such that each attribute-parent (AP) in 𝑁 has a noisy conditional distribution. 3) Data 
synthesis: 𝑁 and the 𝑑 noisy conditional distributions are used to derive an approximate distribution of the 
tuples in 𝑂, and then sample tuples from the approximate distribution to generate a synthetic dataset 𝐷. In 
brief, PrivBayes utilizes a low-degree Bayesian network 𝑁 to generate a synthetic dataset 𝐷 that 
approximates the high-dimensional input data 𝑂. 
Similar to PrivBayes, JTree was proposed as a novel sampling-based inference framework to preserve 
the joint distribution of high-dimensional data under DP. This framework features a sophisticated 
systematic exploration of pairwise attribute dependencies and establishes a solid inference foundation based 
on the junction tree algorithm. Specifically, JTree is composed of the following four steps: 1) build the 
dependency graph; the first step is to learn the pairwise correlations of all attributes under a sampling-based 
testing framework, from which a dependency graph is generated. 2) form attribute clusters; JTree applies 
the junction tree algorithm to the dependency graph to generate a set of cliques to form the inference 
foundation and further identify a collection of attribute clusters to derive all the noisy marginals of these 
cliques with the minimum error. 3) generate noisy marginals; for each attribute cluster, we generate a 
differentially private marginal table and enforce consistency constraints over all such marginals. 4) produce 
a synthetic dataset; JTree makes use of the noisy marginal tables and the inference model to efficiently 
generate a synthetic dataset. Other methods in the category of parametric DPDR include DP-GAN [18, 19, 
20], GANObfuscator [21], and PATE-GAN [22]. 
On the other hand, Priview [23] and DPSynthesizer [24] are two representative examples in the 
category of non-parametric DPDR. Priview and DPSynthesizer are similar in that they first generate 
different marginal contingency tables. The main difference between parametric and non-parametric DPDR 
lies in the fact that the former assumes a hidden data distribution, whereas the latter processes the 
corresponding contingency table directly. Specifically, noise is applied to each cell of the contingency 
tables to derive the noisy table. Noisy marginal contingency tables are combined to reconstruct the 
potentially high-dimensional dataset, followed by a sophisticated design of the post-processing step for 
further utility enhancement. Other methods in the category of non-parametric DPDR include DPCube [25], 
DPCopula [26], and DPWavelet [27]. 
 
1.1.2 Risk of Disclosure (RoD) Metrics 
Very few research efforts have been devoted to developing RoD, although DP has its own theoretical 
foundation for privacy. The research gap arises because the privacy level of DP is inherent in the DP 
definition, according to which the query results only differ negligibly from those of neighboring datasets. 
 
However, in practice, the user needs to know who, or which information is protected, which privacy level 
is achieved, the probability of re-identifying an individual, and the effect of the perturbed record values on 
the statistical analysis tasks. On the other hand, although a large number of DPDR algorithms have emerged, 
owing to the lack of a clear and understandable definition of RoD, the choice of 𝜖 has always been critical 
and has hindered the practical deployment of DPDR systems. Thus, the RoD would need to be quantified 
to answer the above questions properly. 
Toward the development of easy-to-understand privacy notions, Lee and Clifton [28] made the first 
effort to define the RoD. They used a game to define the RoD. Specifically, given a dataset 𝑂 with 𝑚 
records, the trusted party tosses a coin and determines whether a specific record 𝑟 ∈ 𝑂 needs to be deleted, 
depending on the result of the toss. Let 𝐷 be the resulting dataset. The objective of the attacker is to 
determine the presence or absence of the record 𝑟, with arbitrary knowledge of the datasets 𝑂 and 𝐷. Lee 
and Clifton formulated the attacker as a Bayesian attacker who maximizes the probability of guessing 
correctly by taking advantage of the prior and posterior knowledge of 𝑂, 𝐷, and 𝑟. 
Hsu et al. [29] presented a method for choosing the parameter 𝜖 based on an economic point of view. 
In essence, they based their work on the observation that an individual is financially incentivized to 
contribute sensitive information, whereas a data analyst aims to obtain accurate data. Their economics-
inspired solution [29] reaches an appropriate 𝜖 by maintaining a balance between the released data accuracy 
and the available privacy budget. Naldi and D’Acquisto [30] calculated the parameter 𝜖 in DP on the basis 
of estimation theory. In particular, they address only the counting query and define the notion of RoD in a 
more intuitive manner. This solution is similar to ours in spirit. Nonetheless, their solution applies only to 
the counting query, which restricts its practicality. Tsou et al.  [31] also contributed to the RoD by using a 
probability measure approach. In particular, they consider an original dataset 𝑂 and synthetic dataset 𝐷, 
which is derived from 𝐷 with Laplace noise. Although the magnitude of each addition of Laplace noise is 
unbounded, its value range can be estimated with a certain confidence level. The estimated value range of 
the Laplace noise can be used to calculate the extent to which the noise perturbs record values, which 
indicates the privacy level. 
 
1.2 Research Challenge 
The assessment of the RoD and data utility of the DP synthetic dataset presents the following two 
difficulties. 
● RoD requires good explainability for layman users in terms of a privacy guarantee, while 
simultaneously allowing quantitative interpretation to enable the privacy effect of different 
DPDR algorithms to be compared. In particular, although the privacy budget 𝜖 in DP has a 
mathematical explanation, it is difficult for layman users to comprehend the meaning behind 
the definition. Moreover, the privacy budget is inconsistent with the requirements in the 
current privacy regulations such as GDPR and CCPA, because the relation between 𝜖 and 
legal terms such as “single-out” remains to be investigated. 
● Usually, it is necessary to generate a synthetic dataset and then estimate the corresponding 
privacy level by calculating the RoD. Nonetheless, this process requires an uncertain number 
of iterative steps until the pre-defined privacy level is reached, leading to inefficiency in 
synthetic dataset generation. Thus, the aim is to develop a solution that can efficiently estimate 
the privacy level of the DP synthetic dataset. 
The methods in Section 1.1 can be used to either estimate the parameter 𝜖 of DP or quantify the privacy 
level, but each of these methods has its own limitations. In particular, the results of two of these studies   
[29]  and [28]  are valid only for interactive DP, where the data analyst continually receives query responses 
for a specific query. Nevertheless, the DPDR under consideration in this study is a type of noninteractive 
DP (see Section 2.1), which results in the publication of the noisy dataset and which allows an arbitrary 
number of all kinds of queries. Thus, the studies [29] and [28] are not applicable to the assessment of RoD. 
Moreover, despite the relevance of the previous method [30] to the setting of noninteractive DP, its inherent 
 
limitation is that it is only applicable to counting queries. The work of Sarathy and Muralidhar [32]  has a 
similar limitation in that it only applies to numerical data. Tsou et al. [31] made the inherent assumption 
that a differentially private synthetic dataset is created by directly adding Laplacian noise to the original 
dataset, which is not the case because of the extremely low utility. The design of PriBayes, JTree, Priview, 
and DPSynthesizer (in Section 1.1.1) similarly indicate that a more sophisticated design is used for DPDR, 
further limiting the applicability of this work [31]. 
 
1.3 Contribution 
Our work makes the following two contributions: 
● We develop the notion of RoD for the DP synthetic dataset. The difficulty of defining the RoD 
lies in the fact that the state-of-the-art DPDR algorithms in essence decouple the original 
dataset from the synthetic dataset. Therefore, existing techniques were not used. Here, we take 
an alternative point of view in that we strive to quantify the RoD without making unrealistic 
assumptions. 
● Based on the curve fitting approach, we develop a unified framework to efficiently determine 
the privacy budget 𝜖 given the desirable privacy level and utility. 
 
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Differential Privacy (DP) 
Consider a statistical database in which a trusted party (the data owner) stores a dataset that contains 
sensitive private information (e.g., medical records and financial information). The database provides 
statistical information about the data in response to queries from a data analyst. DP serves as a theoretical 
framework for formalizing privacy in the statistical database. 
Let 𝜖 be a positive real number and 𝑀 be a randomized algorithm that takes a dataset as input 
(representing the actions of the trusted party holding the data). The algorithm 𝑀 is 𝜖-DP if, for all 
neighboring datasets 𝐷! and 𝐷" that differ with respect to a single element (e.g., the data of one person), 
and all subsets 𝑆 of the image of 𝑀, 
𝑃𝑟[𝑀(𝐷!) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒# × 𝑃𝑟[𝑀(𝐷") ∈ 𝑆],	                                       (1) 
where the parameter 𝜖 can be adjusted in view of the tradeoff between privacy and utility; a smaller 𝜖 
implies greater privacy. Therefore, the parameter 𝜖 is also known as the privacy budget in the sense that, as 
the number of sequential responses increases, the privacy guarantee diminishes, depending on the initial 
setting of 𝜖. The definition of DP provides a strong privacy guarantee that the presence or absence of an 
individual will not affect the final output of the algorithm significantly. 
DP can be achieved by a Laplace mechanism [33]. Specifically, the noise sampled from a zero-mean 
Laplace distribution is added to the query result, and then the noisy query result is returned to the data 
analyst. The shape of the Laplace distribution is determined jointly by 𝜖 and global sensitivity, 
𝛥$ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥%!,%"
||𝑞(𝐷!) − 𝑞(𝐷")||,	                                       (2) 
of the query function 𝑞; that is, for any query 𝑞 and mechanism 𝑀, 
𝑀(𝐷) = 𝑞(𝐷) + 𝐿𝑎𝑝('#
#
)	                                                    (3) 
 
is 𝜖-DP, where 𝐿𝑎𝑝('#
#
) is a random variable that follows a zero-mean Laplace distribution. Obviously, 
as mentioned above, 𝜖 controls the tradeoff between privacy and utility because larger values of 𝜖 imply a 
more concentrated Laplace distribution and therefore less perturbation of a specific record value. DP 
features the sequential composition theorem, which states that by querying the dataset 𝑘 times, if each noisy 
response satisfies 𝜖-DP, then all the 𝑘 queries achieve 𝑘𝜖-DP together. In addition, DP involves post-
 
processing, which states that any kind of data-independent processing of a noisy answer (𝜖-DP) does not 
compromise its privacy guarantee. 
DP can be categorized as interactive or non-interactive. In the former, a dedicated server is located 
between the data owner and data analyst and perturbs the query result before forwarding it. In the latter, the 
data owner simply releases a processed dataset to the public without further interaction with anyone. The 
synthetic dataset approach is representative in the category of non-interactive DP. Throughout the paper, 
we consider the non-interactive setting of DP (i.e., DPDR) with a Laplace mechanism unless stated 
otherwise. 
 
2.2 Voronoi Diagram 
In our proposed algorithm in Section 3.2.3, we take advantage of the Voronoi Diagram, a mathematical 
concept which refers to partitioning a plane into adjacent regions called Voronoi cells to cover a finite set 
of points [34]. The definition of a Voronoi diagram is as follows [34, 35]: Let 𝑋 be a set of 𝑛 points (called 
sites or generators) in the plane. For two distinct points 𝑥	, 𝑦	 ∈ 𝑋 the Voronoi region/cell associated to 𝑥 is 
the set of all points in 𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒	that are closer to 𝑥 than to any other point in the plane (i.e. the nearest 
neighbor to the point). In other words, the region associated to 𝑥 is all the points in the plane lying in all of 
the dominances of 𝑦, i.e., 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛	(𝑥) = 	⋂(∈*+{-}𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	(𝑥, 𝑦), where d𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	(𝑥, 𝑦) = {𝑝 ∈
𝑅"|𝑙"	(𝑝, 𝑥) ≤ 	 𝑙"	(𝑝, 𝑦)} , where 𝑙" is the Euclidean distance. Due to specific geometrical structure of 
Voronoi diagrams and their simplicity in visual perception, they have been used by several research studies, 
such as file searching, scheduling and clustering [34]. Recently, the Voronoi diagram has also been used 
for preserving location privacy in various research studies [36, 37, 38] . In [36] the authors propose a privacy 
preserving model for mobile crowd computing to hide users in a cloaked area based on the Voronoi diagram. 
This paper takes advantage of the Voronoi diagram to provide k-anonymity for users in each Voronoi cell. 
In another study, Bi et al [38] combine local differential privacy and Voronoi diagram in order to preserve 
privacy in edge computing.  
Compared to the state-of-the-art, in this paper we adopt Voronoi diagram in a completely different 
manner for evaluating the risk of disclosure in a differentially private dataset.  
 
3 Proposed Approach for Evaluating Risk of Disclosure 
In the following, we consider the setting of an original dataset 𝑂 and the corresponding differentially 
private synthetic dataset 𝐷, both sized 𝑚 × 𝑛 and with numeric attributes 𝐴!, 𝐴", …, 𝐴/. Each record in 𝑂 
represents personal information; a concrete example of 𝑂 is a medical dataset, where each record 
corresponds to the diagnosis of a patient. We do not assume a particular DPDR algorithm unless stated 
otherwise. The DPDR algorithms in Section 1.1.1 are all available for consideration. We aim to develop 
useful notions of RoD and utility that can fairly measure the RoD and utility of 𝐷, given the access to 𝑂 
and the satisfaction of 𝜖-DP. 
First, we discuss a simple metric for RoD in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we present several candidate 
notions of RoD, and then claim that the combined notion would be the best by justifying its self-
explainability. Thereafter, Section 3.3 presents our solution for fast evaluation of the utility of the synthetic 
dataset given a specific privacy level. Finally, we present in Section 3.4 a unified approach to determine 
the privacy budget 𝜖 by jointly considering RoD and utility. 
3.1 Straightforward Metric for RoD 
Irrespective of the approach that was followed to generate the synthetic dataset, each record in 𝐷 could 
be “fake”; i.e., the existence or non-existence of a record in the synthetic dataset does not indicate the 
existence status of this record in the original dataset. In theory, even an attacker with abundant background 
knowledge cannot infer the individual information in 𝑂. Specifically, the privacy foundation lies in the fact 
that 𝐷 is no longer a transformed version of 𝑂, and one cannot link 𝑂 and 𝐷. Nonetheless, in reality, layman 
users are still concerned about the probability of the attacker re-identifying an individual from the synthetic 
 
dataset. We term this phenomenon the scapegoat effect. In particular, the scapegoat effect states that despite 
the fact that the information about an individual 𝑥 in 𝑂 will almost certainly not appear in 𝐷, because a 
record 𝑥W in 𝐷 could be sufficiently similar to 𝑥 and the attacker only has partial knowledge of 𝑥, the attacker 
will (falsely) identify 𝑥W as 𝑥. We claim the importance of the scapegoat effect because this is similar to the 
skewness attack in 𝑙-diversity [14]. In other words, an innocent individual might be accused of a crime if 
they are misclassified as either being or not being in the dataset. 
Considering that most people may be concerned about the probability of an individual being re-
identified by an attacker, given a synthetic dataset, a straightforward method for assessing the privacy level 
of the synthetic dataset would be to calculate the hitting rate, which is defined as the ratio of the number of 
overlapping records to the total number 𝑚 of records in both datasets. Despite its conceptual simplicity, the 
use of the hitting rate incurs two problems. 
● First, because of the curse of dimensionality, the density of the data points in a high-
dimensional space is usually low. This could easily result in a very low hitting rate and an 
overestimated level of privacy guarantee. 
● Second, such an assessment metric leads to a trivial algorithm for a zero hitting rate. For 
example, a synthetic dataset could be constructed by applying a tiny (and non-DP) amount of 
noise to each record in the original dataset. Owing to the noise, the records in the original and 
synthetic datasets do not overlap, leading to a zero hitting rate and an overestimated level of 
privacy. 
 
3.2 Our Proposed Methods for RoD 
Here, we provide distance-based metrics to estimate the RoD. In particular, with the concern that the 
original dataset 𝑂 has already been decoupled from the synthetic dataset 𝐷 by the non-interactive DP, it 
would always be difficult to link the records in 𝑂 and 𝐷. This may, in turn, imply difficulty in defining the 
appropriate RoD. Note that the previous work [29, 28, 30, 32, 31] sought different ways to create the linkage 
between 𝑂 and 𝐷. However, the privacy notion based on the linkage between these two must have a security 
flaw, especially in the sense that such a linkage does not exist. 
In the following, taking the scapegoat effect into consideration, a distance-based framework, (𝑦, 𝑝)-
coverage, is first proposed in Section 3.2.1 to minimize the scapegoat effect and to reconcile the privacy 
level and decoupling of 𝑂 and 𝐷. The rationale behind our design is the observation that with no knowledge 
of the straightforward linkage between 𝑂 and 𝐷, the attacker could seek only the closest record in 𝑂 as the 
candidate original record in 𝐷. However, (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage is not suitable for measuring RoD because it has 
two parameters and does not have total order (described in more detail at the end of Section 3.2.1). 
Subsequently, we propose RoD metrics to measure the risk of re-identification. 
 
3.2.1 (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage 
Here, we propose the notion of (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage as a framework for evaluating RoD. The rationale 
behind (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage is that, given access to 𝐷, the attacker would exhaustively search over the proximity 
of a specific record 𝐷0, where 𝐷0 denotes the 𝑖th record of 𝐷 (𝑖th row of 𝐷), to find the candidate record in 
𝑂. In this sense, with the observation that 𝑂 and 𝐷 would be of the same size, the data owner may formulate 
the privacy metric as a minimum weight bipartite matching problem and use the Hungarian Algorithm to 
evaluate the RoD. In particular, Algorithm 1 is proposed to test whether the distance-based (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage 
is fulfilled. Given 𝑂 and 𝐷, we construct a complete weighted bipartite graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸,𝑊), where 
𝑉 = 𝑂 ∪ 𝐷	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐸 = {(𝑂0 , 𝐷1)}2$∈2,%%∈% .	                                             (4) 
In the graph 𝐺, each edge is associated with a weight; the weights are defined as 
𝑊 = {𝑒01}	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑒01 = ||𝑂0 − 𝐷1||.	                                                     (5) 
 
 
The graph 𝐺 has 2𝑚 vertices, each of which can be regarded as an 𝑛-dimensional row vector from 
either 𝑂 or 𝐷. 𝐺 is completely bipartite in the sense that the vertices from 𝑂 and those from 𝐷 are fully 
connected, but there is no edge for 𝑂 (and 𝐷). Furthermore, the notation || ⋅ || denotes the norm. Here, we 
implicitly assume the use of the Euclidean distance for ||𝑂0 − 𝐷1|| = ||(𝜒!, … , 𝜒/)|| for certain 𝜒!, … , 𝜒/. 
However, the other norm can also be used as an alternative. 
Given a matching 𝑀, let its incidence vector be 𝑥, where 𝑥01 = 1 if (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝑀 and 0 otherwise, and 
the perfect matching of the minimum weight is a subset of edge weights such that 
𝑚𝑖𝑛∑ 𝑐01𝑥01 ,0,1 	                                                    (6) 
 
where 𝑐01 = 𝑤01. After applying the Hungarian algorithm, we can obtain perfect matching and the 
corresponding edge weight 𝜔, where 𝜔 is an 𝑚-dimensional vector with the 𝑖th entry being an edge weight 
of the minimum weighted bipartite matching for 𝐷0. Given a user-defined weight 𝑦, we then calculate the 
number of weights less than or equal to 𝑦 as a count 𝜁, 
𝜉 = ∑ 𝐼3$4(
5
06! ,	                                     (7) 
 
where 𝐼3$4( denotes an indicator function with 𝐼3$4( = 1 in the case of 𝜔0 ≤ 𝑦, and 𝐼3$4( = 0 
otherwise. Subsequently, we compute 𝑝′ as 𝑝′ = 𝜁/𝑚. Given a user-defined probability 𝑝, we claim that 𝐷 
fulfills (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage if 𝑝′ ≤ 𝑝. 
 
Algorithm 1 (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage 
Input: User defined weight: 𝑦 
Input: User defined probability: 𝑝 
Input: Original dataset: 𝑂 
Input: DP dataset: 𝐷 
Output: Whether 𝐷 fufills (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage 
1:	𝑀	 ← 	𝐻𝑈𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁	𝐴𝐿𝐺𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐻𝑀	(𝑂, 𝐷);	 
2:  𝜉 = ∑ 𝐼3$4(;
5
06! 	 
3: 𝑝′ = 𝜁/𝑚 
4: return (𝑝′ ≤ 𝑝) ? fulfilled: not fulfilled; 
 
Despite its conceptual simplicity and theoretical foundation, (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage cannot be used for 
assessing RoD because (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage has two parameters 𝑦 and 𝑝 and does not have total order. Note that 
the purpose of developing the RoD metric is to enable layman users to conveniently choose the privacy 
budget 𝜖 in DP. However, when the notion of (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage is used, it may be difficult to determine which 
of, for example, (3,0.5)-coverage and (4,0.4)-coverage, improves the privacy. Hence, the following 
sections define additional privacy notions with total order to enable an RoD comparison. 
3.2.2 𝑦-Privacy 
The (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage inherently assumes that the strategy adopted by the attacker is to search for a 
bijective matching between 𝑂 and 𝐷 by using the Hungarian algorithm. However, this assumption can be 
relaxed in the sense that the attacker may perform an exhaustive search to find the closest record in 𝑂 for a 
specific record in 𝐷. During this process, two records in 𝐷 may happen to be close to the same record in 𝑂. 
In (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage, however, we retain one matching and force the remaining record in 𝐷 to have other 
matchings. Therefore, in this section, we propose the notion of 𝑦-privacy to break the tie. It should be 
mentioned that 𝑦-privacy focuses more on the worst-case analysis, whereas (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage places more 
 
emphasis on the average-case analysis. 
We propose Algorithm 2 to be used for verifying whether 𝐷 satisfies 𝑦-privacy. In the following, we 
temporarily assume the case of 𝑛 = 1 with integral values in 𝑂 for ease of representation. Specifically, in 
Algorithm 2, we focus only on finding the mapping, instead of the matching, between 𝑂 and 𝐷 with the 
minimum incurred noise. First, for each record 𝐷0 in 𝐷, we find the minimum value 𝑦0′ such that [𝐷0 ± 𝑦0′] 
contains one original record in 𝑂. Then, for each 𝑦0′ in 𝑦′, 
𝑦′ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛!4145q|𝐷0 − 𝑂1q|.                                                                                 (8) 
 
Eq. (8) states that when the attacker sees a record because 𝑦 can be seen as all of the possibilities, it 
needs to be verified whether this was a brute-force guess. Consequently, a higher 𝑦 implies improved 
privacy. In this sense, Eq. (8) can also be understood as the probability of the attacker successfully guessing 
an original record in 𝑂 within the range [𝐷0 − 𝑦,𝐷0 + 𝑦] given a record 𝐷0 ∈ 𝐷 is always at most 1/(2𝑦 +
1). An alternative to choosing 𝑦′ is to choose the median of 𝑦′ as 𝑦 to balance the utility and privacy. 
However, the choice of 𝑦′ returns to the average-case analysis, whereas choosing the minimum 𝑦′ as 𝑦 
retains the worst-case analysis. 
 
Algorithm 2  𝑦 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦. 
Input: Original dataset: 𝑂 
Input: DP dataset: 𝐷 
Output: 𝑦 
1:	𝑦07 = 0,				1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚; 
2: for  𝑖 = 1 to 𝑚 do 
3:         𝑦0′ = find min 𝑦0′  s.t. [𝐷0 ± 𝑦0′] contains 𝑂1; 
4: 𝑦 = (	{𝑦0′}06!/ ) 
5: return 𝑦; 
 
Algorithm 2 can be easily extended to the case of 𝑛 ≥ 2, except that the operation [𝐷0 ± 𝑦0′] is 
undefined because 𝐷0 is 𝑛-dimensional. This can be easily patched by considering ||𝐷0 − 𝑥|| ≤ 𝑦 for all 𝑛-
dimensional vectors 𝑥. The same approach can be applied to the operation [𝐷0 ± 𝑦0′] even if the record 
values are floating numbers. 
Under the framework of (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage, 𝑦-privacy considers a general attack strategy and provides a 
worst-case guarantee. Compared to (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage, 𝑦-privacy has total order, and it is easy to see that 𝑦-
privacy is better than 𝑦′-privacy when 𝑦 ≥ 𝑦′ in terms of the privacy guarantee. Intuitively, the above 
argument that 𝑦-privacy is better than 𝑦′-privacy when 𝑦 ≥ 𝑦′ also indicates that each record in the synthetic 
dataset satisfying 𝑦-privacy will be at least 𝑦-far away from the closest record in the original dataset, in 
contrast to the synthetic dataset, which satisfies 𝑦′-privacy. However, 𝑦-privacy is still less useful when a 
dense dataset is considered. Specifically, 𝑦-privacy and (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage share the common weakness that 
when the dataset is densely distributed, the parameter 𝑦 in 𝑦-privacy and (𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage will be very small 
because the records are close to each other both before and after the addition of noise. This results in the 
parameter 𝑦 being less meaningful in representing the privacy level. 
 
3.2.3 Voronoi Privacy 
The notion of 𝑦-privacy can also be generalized to consider its extreme condition. In other words, 
 
because 𝑦-privacy considers a 𝑦-radius ball centered at each data point and considers the number of data 
points in 𝑂 covered by this 𝑦-radius ball, we can follow this perspective and consider the 𝑦-radius balls 
centered at all data points in 𝑂. The rationale behind the above consideration is to determine the 
arrangement of the dataset with the optimal 𝑦-privacy. Expanding the radius of all 𝑦-radius balls ultimately 
leads to a Voronoi diagram [39]. As explained in Section 2.2, this diagram is a partition of a multi-
dimensional space into regions close to each of a given set of data points. Note that a Voronoi diagram can 
be efficiently constructed for two-dimensional data points, but for high-dimensional data points this would 
only be possible by using approximation algorithms [40, 41]. The Voronoi diagram is characterized by the 
fact that, for each data point, a corresponding region consisting of all points of the multi-dimensional space 
exists closer to that data point than to any other. In other words, all positions within a Voronoi cell are more 
inclined to be classified as a particular data point.  
From the perspective of RoD, we then have an interpretation that, in terms of 𝑦-privacy, each record 
in 𝐷 cannot be located at these positions within the Voronoi cell; otherwise, an attacker who finds such a 
record in 𝐷 is more inclined to link to a particular record in 𝑂. The above argument lies in the theoretical 
foundation of Voronoi privacy. Algorithm 3 shows the calculation of Voronoi privacy, given access to 𝑂 
and 𝐷. In particular, the rationale behind Voronoi privacy is to derive the optimal privatized dataset 𝐷t (in 
terms of privacy) first, and then calculate the distance between 𝐷 and 𝐷t as an RoD metric. A larger distance 
implies a higher level of dissimilarity between 𝐷 and 𝐷t and therefore a lower risk of data closure. 
 
Algorithm 3  Voronoi−𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦. 
Input: Original dataset: 𝑂 
Input: DP dataset: 𝐷 
Output: Distance  𝑑 
1: Setup 𝐷t as an empty dataset; 
2: Construct Voronoi diagram from 𝑂; 
3: for  𝑖 = 1 to 𝑚 do 
4:     Calculate 𝐷t0 as the closest point on Voronoi edges; 
5:      𝐷t =	𝐷t 	∪ u𝐷8t v; 
6: 𝑑	 = 	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	(𝐷, 𝐷t); 
7: return 𝑑; 
 
In this sense, first, Algorithm 3 constructs an empty dataset 𝐷t. The subsequent procedures gradually 
add records to 𝐷t, making it optimal in terms of privacy. Then, Algorithm 3 constructs a Voronoi diagram 
from 𝑂 because the data owner would like to know the corresponding optimal privatized dataset. As 
mentioned previously, approximation algorithms [40, 41] might be candidates for this task. Once the data 
owner has a Voronoi diagram from 𝑂, the collection of data points on the Voronoi diagram constitutes the 
optimal privatized dataset. Thus, an infinite number of optimal privatized datasets are available. Here, we 
aim to find the optimal privatized dataset with the optimal data utility. Considering that more perturbation 
on the record in 𝑂 implies lower data utility, for each data point in 𝑂, the closest point on Voronoi edges 
would have been identified. The data owner collects all these data points as 𝐷t. Thereafter, the data owner 
calculates the distance between 𝐷 and 𝐷t as an RoD metric. We particularly mention that different choices 
of the Distance function are possible in the implementation, depending on the domain of the dataset. In 
general, the 𝑙" distance (Euclidean distance) can be used, whereas the earth mover distance (EMD) could 





In Algorithm 4, inspired by JTree, we define a privacy metric, 𝑝-privacy, by taking advantage of the 
notion of dependency among attributes of the dataset. In particular, in reality, the attacker would not 
perform a random guess; instead, they would make educated guesses according to the distribution of 𝑂. 
Although the attacker is not in the possession of 𝑂, because 𝐷 and 𝑂 are approximately equally distributed, 
they can still make educated guesses by taking advantage of the distribution of 𝐷. Based on this idea, to 
reduce the futile combinations in the general case of 𝑛 ≥ 2, we first construct the dependency graph 𝐺 by 
computing the correlation among attributes, in contrast to the exhaustive search feature in 𝑦-privacy and 
(𝑦, 𝑝)-coverage. After obtaining the dependency graph, we consider each linked part as a clique and obtain 
clique set 𝐶. For each clique 𝐶0 in 𝐶, we calculate 𝐷9$, where 𝐷9$ are records with values only for the 
attributes in 𝐶0. Let 𝑈 be the set of 𝐷9$. Then, we merge each 𝐷9$ in 𝑈 to produce a candidate table 𝐹 with 
∏ q𝐷9$q
|;|
06!  combinations. Such a candidate table 𝐹 represents the records that the attacker considers more 
likely to be the records in 𝑂. Subsequently, we compare 𝐹 with 𝑂 to find a count 𝜉, where the records of 𝐹 
belong to 𝑂, and then obtain the attack probability 𝑝, 
𝑝 = <|=| ⋅
<
|2|
.	                                        (9) 
 
Algorithm 4  𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦. 
Input: Original dataset: 𝑂 
Input: DP dataset: 𝐷 
Output: Attack probability  𝑝 
1: Construct the dependency graph 𝐺 of  𝐷; 
2: Make the linked part of the clique and the set of cliques is 𝐶; 
3: for  𝑖 = 1 to |𝐶| do 
4:       𝑈0 	← 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒	(𝐷9$); 
5: F = {∏ 𝑈0
|;|
06! };     
6: 𝜉 = ∑ 𝐼=$∈2;
|=|
16! 	 




8: return 𝑝; 
 
We demonstrate the functioning of 𝑝-privacy by considering an original dataset 𝑂 and synthetic dataset 
𝐷, as shown below. 
 
 
𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑨𝟑 𝑨𝟒 𝑨𝟓 
3 5 1 2 3 
8 1 2 3 4 




𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑨𝟑 𝑨𝟒 𝑨𝟓 
4 5 1 2 3 
8 7 2 3 4 





After the first two steps, we have 𝐶 = {𝐴1, 𝐴2, (𝐴3, 𝐴4, 𝐴5)}. Next, in step 3 we obtain 𝑈 =
{(3,4,8), (1,5,7), [(1,2,3), (2,3,4)]}. In step 4, we calculate the combination table 𝐹. 
 
𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑨𝟑 𝑨𝟒 𝑨𝟓 
3 1 1 2 3 
3 1 2 3 4 
3 5 1 2 3 
3 5 2 3 4 
3 7 1 2 3 
3 7 2 3 4 
4 1 1 2 3 
4 1 2 3 4 
4 5 1 2 3 
4 5 2 3 4 
4 7 1 2 3 
4 7 2 3 4 
8 1 1 2 3 
8 1 2 3 4 
8 5 1 2 3 
8 5 2 3 4 
8 7 1 2 3 
8 7 2 3 4 
F 









3.2.5 Data-Driven Approach for Determining 𝜖 
Although the estimation of different privacy metrics is proposed in Section 3.2.1∼3.2.4, we still 
require a method for choosing an appropriate 𝜖 in DP for a given privacy level. In the following, we propose 
solutions to obtain satisfactory values for 𝜖. 
Strawman Approach for Determining 𝜖. Inspired by JTree [42], Algorithm 5 uses the features from 
JTree to retrieve the 𝜖 that satisfies the user’s risk and utility requirements. Obviously, if the original dataset 
is uniformly distributed, we only need to add a minor amount of noise to reach the desirable perturbation 
on the dataset because of the low sensitivity of each record. However, if the original dataset is not uniformly 
distributed, we have to protect the sensitive records by using additional noise, as stated in Section 2.1. 
Specifically, with the marginal tables in [42], the data owner can easily find the sensitive records and 
decide the level of Laplacian noise needed. Thus, we first construct the dependency graph and calculate the 
marginal tables. Subsequently, given a user-defined probability 𝑝 that represents the acceptable utility and 
privacy level, we can retrieve the value of 𝜖 from the equation 
𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝐿𝑎𝑝 '(B)
#
.	                                     (10) 
 
Note that the above procedures can be thought of as a reduced JTree algorithm with truncated 
 
operations. Moreover, as we are more concerned with count queries, the global sensitivity 𝛥(𝑓) is 1. Then, 
we use the 95% confidence interval (𝜇 + 2𝜎) of 𝐿𝑎𝑝(!
#
) as the maximum value that represents 𝑝. This value 
enables us to calculate 𝜖 that satisfies the user’s requirement via Algorithm 5. 
 
Algorithm 5 Strawman Approach for Determining  𝜖 
Input: User defined probability: 𝑝 
Input: Original dataset: 𝑂 
Output: 𝜖, which satisfies the user-defined privacy 
1: Construct the dependency graph 𝐺 of  𝑂; 
2: Calculate the marginal tables 𝑀 of 𝐺 
3: 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝐿𝑎𝑝 '(B)
#
	; 
4: 𝛥(𝑓) = 1 
5: 𝑝	 = 	𝑚𝑎𝑥	 𝐿𝑎𝑝 !
D
 = 22 !
#
	 and thus 𝜖 = 	22 !
#
	 
6: return 𝜖; 
 
Unfortunately, Algorithm 5 poses certain problems, such as the possibility that, because of the 
differences among the noise adding mechanisms (e.g., the Laplace, exponential, and Gaussian 
mechanisms), the 𝜖 retrieved from Algorithm 5 may not be suitable for other mechanisms. Furthermore, 
because the utility is closely related to 𝜖, the precision of 𝜖 is also important, especially when 𝜖 is small. 
This makes it necessary to find a more accurate method with which to estimate 𝜖. 
Data-Driven Approach for Determining 𝜖. The most straightforward method for determining 𝜖 is to 
generate a synthetic dataset with a specific 𝜖 and then determine whether the desirable privacy level is 
satisfied. Unfortunately, this would be very time-consuming because an unbounded number of trials would 
need to be conducted. Therefore, we propose using curve fitting, a data-driven approach, to learn the 
relationship between privacy measures and 𝜖. Once the curve is known, 𝜖 can be calculated instantly, given 
the desired level of privacy. In particular, the corresponding privacy measures can be obtained after 
generating a number of synthetic datasets with different 𝜖 values. Thereafter, the curve can be learned on 
the basis of the learned privacy measures. However, during the process of curve fitting, although this would 
enable the best fitted coefficients for the chosen curve to be learned, one independent variable that remains 
to be determined is the type of curve. Initially, we choose curves such as exponential, polynomial, and 




Figure 1: Curve fitting of Algorithm 2 risk estimation 
 
Fig. 1 shows that the reciprocal curve of degree 2 implies the best fit. The predictions in Table 1 are 
quite close to the real risk distances. 
 
Table 1: Predicted risk distance and the real risk distance 
𝜖 Real risk distance 
Predicted risk 
distance 
0.02 37 37 
0.05 34 28 
0.1 18 18 
0.5 6 7 
1 6 6 
5 5 5 
10 5 5 
 
3.3 Evaluating Utility 
3.3.1 Straightforward Method for Evaluating Utility 
As mentioned previously, even though the privacy level achieved by the synthetic dataset fulfills the 
data owner’s requirement, the utility is also indispensable. A straightforward method for calculating the 
utility is to generate a synthetic dataset with a specific set of parameters and then evaluate the corresponding 
utility by considering the desired operations on the synthetic dataset. Nonetheless, such an exhaustive 
search-like method does not scale; one may need to spend an infinite amount of time trying different sets 
of parameters, which could be highly time-consuming. As a result, a mechanism capable of efficiently 
learning the utility of a given synthetic dataset is desired. 
In the following, because the mean, standard deviation, and variance are the most popular metrics for 
evaluating utility in the literature, we similarly used these three metrics to estimate the error of the result 
incurred by the use of synthetic dataset 𝐷. The error of variance incurred by the use of synthetic dataset 𝐷 









To evaluate the variance error of the entire dataset, we simply sum up the errors for each record, 
𝜖FGH = ∑ 𝜖E$
FGH/𝑛./06!                                      (12) 
 
Obviously, a smaller estimation error for the synthetic dataset implies higher utility. The analysis of 
other statistical measures is also similar to the above formulas. Note that we used these statistical measures 
not only because of their popularity and simplicity, but also because we can learn a rough distribution from 
these measurements. Moreover, if the errors of these simple measures are too large, the results of other 
complex statistical measures would not be sufficiently accurate to use. 
 
3.3.2 Data-driven Method for Evaluating Utility 
In reality, the most popular method for computing the error incurred by the synthetic dataset is to 
compute Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) over the differentially private synthetic datasets with 𝜖 = {0.01,0.1,1,10}. 
For example, the errors incurred by different settings of 𝜖 are shown in Fig. 2, where the input dataset is a 
5 × 1𝑒6 health dataset with five attributes {HEIGHT, WEIGHT, BMI, DBP, SBP}1. 
The above process of choosing a new ϵ, generating a new synthetic dataset, and then calculating the 
utility is inefficient. This can be attributed to the fact that the data owner may be unsatisfied with the utility 
of the current version of the synthetic dataset and therefore would prefer to use another version of the 
synthetic dataset. In this sense, we decided to generate synthetic datasets for each candidate ϵ, and then 
estimate their errors. This process is repeated until the value of ϵ is satisfactory. However, the process of 
generating a large number of synthetic datasets is expected to be highly time-consuming. In addition, a 
large original dataset could be expected to further reduce the efficiency. As a result, we propose the use of 
curve fitting, a data-driven approach, to learn the relationship between utility measures (e.g., the error of 
the mean, standard deviation, and variance) and ϵ. Once we learn the curve, we can calculate ϵ very quickly, 
given the desired level of utility. 
 
   
(a) Each attribute (b) Log10 (c) Average 
Figure 2: Different methods to analyze the error of variance  
 
In particular, in the case of 𝜖FGH, 𝜖FGH can be obtained after generating a number of synthetic datasets 
 
1 DBP and SBP denote the diastolic and systolic blood pressure, respectively. The height and weight are manually generated by 
sampling from a normal distribution. The BMI is calculated from the height and weight, and DBP and SBP are generated from 
BMI with a slight level of noise. 
 
with different values of 𝜖. Thereafter, the curve could be learned using the obtained values of 𝜖FGH. 
However, during the process of curve fitting, although this could be used to learn the coefficients that 
best fit the chosen curve, one independent variable that remains to be determined is the type of curve. 
Initially, we choose exponential, polynomial, and reciprocal curves. We observe that the reciprocal curve 
with the following form: 
𝜖̂FGH = G
#
+ 𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑅,	                                                            (13) 
 
where 𝜖̂FGH denotes the estimator of 𝜖FGH, is the best fit in most cases. For completeness, we also 
present different curves that correspond to the error of several statistical measures in Fig. 3. As shown in 
the figure, the reciprocal curve fits almost perfectly. After the experiments, by averaging all the coefficients 
of the formulas, we obtain 
𝜖̂FGH = !
J#
.	                          (14) 
 
   
(a) Mean (b) Standard Deviation (c) Variance 
Figure 3: Different curve fittings on several statistical measures  
 
In fact, Eq. (14) can be further refined to offer improved predictability. Assume that we aim to 
determine the errors in the cases of 𝜖 = {0.01,0.05,0.1,0.5,1,5,10}. However, we only calculate three errors 
in the cases of 𝜖 = {0.01,0.5,10}. We use these errors to learn the curve. These results are shown in Fig. 4, 
where the real and predicted values of the variance errors in Table 2 are almost perfectly matched. 
Despite the seemingly satisfactory results in Fig. 4, taking a closer look at Table 2, we find that the 
predicted values of 𝜖 = {5,10} are negative, which is undesirable. After determining the characteristics of 
the curve fitting and reciprocal curve, we find that the degraded predictability of the fitted curve is mainly 
caused by the insufficient degree of the reciprocal curve. Consequently, after increasing the degree of the 

















0.01 91.1924361 91.1805406 
0.05 9.1253869   17.7786689 
0.1 3.1175912 8.6034350 
0.5 0.6377946 1.2632478 
1 0.4102599 0.3457244 
5 0.1385792 -0.3882943 
10 0.1335111 -0.4800466 
 
 
   
(a) Mean (b) Standard Deviation (c) Variance 
Figure 4: Curve prediction for several statistical measures  
 
Now, with the newly learned curve, the results in Fig. 5 and Table 3 indicate that the predicted errors 
are consistent with the real error values. 
 
 











0.01 91.1924361 91.1924361 
0.05 9.1253869  7.7767367 
0.1 3.1175912 3.2832387 
0.5 0.6377946 0.6377946 
1 0.4102599 0.3664488 
5 0.1385792 0.1588656 
10 0.1335111 0.1335111 
 
 
3.4 Jointly Evaluating RoD and Utility 
The data utility results when varying 𝑑 in the Voronoi privacy, 𝑦 in the 𝑦-privacy, and 𝑝 in the 𝑝-
privacy, are provided in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively. Obviously, as the RoD increases, the data 
utility is not maintained. This is because additional perturbation is added to the original dataset and therefore 
the synthetic dataset is generated from a data distribution with more noise. 
The above data-driven approaches for evaluating the RoD and utility can be naturally extended to a 
data-driven approach for determining the privacy budget 𝜖 by jointly considering the RoD and utility. In 
essence, from Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, we learn different curves for the privacy level and utility, 
respectively. These two appear to be independent; however, they are dependent on each other from the 
viewpoints of the DP definition and Laplace mechanism. Thus, multidimensional curve fitting may be used 
again over the curves learned from Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 to learn a higher dimensional curve. Because 
the resulting higher dimensional curve is parameterized by 𝜖, the privacy budget 𝜖 may be determined by 
jointly considering the RoD and utility. 
 
   
(a) SVM (b) LR (c) MLP 
Figure 6: Voronoi Privacy vs. Accuracy  
 
 
   
(a) SVM (b) LR (c) MLP 
Figure 7: 𝒚 −Privacy vs. Accuracy  
 
   
(a) SVM (b) LR (c) MLP 
Figure 8: 𝒑 −Privacy vs. Accuracy 
 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed various potential privacy notions and measured the RoD. We also developed 
a unified data-driven framework to determine the privacy budget 𝜖 by jointly considering the RoD and 
utility. This approach enables novice users to easily understand the privacy risk and utility. As a result, 
these users would be able to determine an appropriate privacy budget 𝜖 for DPDR, depending on the amount 
of privacy risk they would be prepared to tolerate and the desired utility.  
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